Findings

Night strikes with candles in Yangon on 12 March 2021. (Photo by Zinko Hein on Unsplash)

The findings from KII and FGD in this study are categorised into two thematic themes: 1) immediate impacts, 2) potential challenges, and 3) emerging trends in the short-term and mid-term strategy.

IMMEDIATE IMPACTS

Immediate impacts of the military coup on the CSOs are rampantly damaging all areas: operations and implementation, strategic level decision making, failure to safeguard the CSOs, financial flows and donor relations.

Impact #1: Almost all operations and implementations by local CSOs have got to stand still for an unforeseeable future.

After the military coup, many CSOs suspended all their operations and implementations for the unforeseeable future. The coup destabilised the political institutions in which CSOs operate.

Government agencies such as ministries and departments, and the legislative institutions, including national and subnational level parliaments and elected members, became out of contact. Therefore, most of the activities of the CSOs became irrelevant. For instance, the policy advocacy works of local CSOs were disrupted when military-appointed persons have occupied different places of the policy mechanisms.

The organisations working on the local governance stopped their function due to the uncertain future of local governance under the military regime. The projects in areas once relatively stable and calm places to operate turned into hostile areas where agreed project implementations become difficult because of the military’s tight security control and arising intense conflicts. Those local CSOs, consulting with their donors or intermediary organisations, realign their projects into possible alternatives. Not only at the operations and implementation level but the strategic level decision makings were affected. One respondent noted:

During the Covid-19 outbreak, we made some structural changes in our organisation. Project activities, for the most part, had been adjusted. Our organisational strategy was untouched then. However, the military coup completely turns our strategy around and forced us to look for alternatives.

(Quoted from Interview with Founder & Executive Director, 35 years, Female)

Impact #2: The rule of law fails to safeguard the existence and operations of CSOs. Offices and staff members had to relocate for security reasons.

The military coup ended the constitutional guarantee on the freedom of association, assembly, and speech. As the military chief holds the total sovereign power, the institutional checks and balances disappeared.

CSOs enjoy no more constitutional protections, whereas anyone involving in organisational functions and activities may face arbitrary arrest. Because there were upsetting cases of organisations that had refused to follow the military's regulations, many local CSOs finds it difficult to continue their operations.

Such a failure in the rule of law system produces the risks and threats of getting black-listed, dissolved, or arrested not only among the CSOs but also among their members individually. Since some staff members decided to support civil resistance movements, they had to relocate their offices and personal residences.

Reflecting on these circumstances, one respondent notes:

It is challenging for both local and international organisations to survive. Even after removing our organisation’s signboard for safety, staying alert day or night proves that civic space is shrinking.

(Quoted from Interview with Co-Founder & Executive Director, 50s years, Male)

Impact #3: The banking crisis disrupted the financial flows of local civil society too.

In the morning of the military takeover, telecommunication and internet blackouts caused many banking transactions to freeze. Under the instruction and pressures of the military, financial flow across the country gets constricted. Consequently, many professional employees in the private banking sector collectively participated in CDM. With mounting worries and shrinking trust over the banking sector, the impact strikes from big businesses to small households; not an exception for civil society.

Since most of them do not have resources and networking to financially sustain, constricted financial flow, both to and from CSOs, in both the institutional and individual level badly hits numerous local CSOs.

In addition, there are incidences in which INGOs such as Open Society Foundation Myanmar, Asia Foundation, and The International Foundation for Electoral Systems have become the hotspot of the military’s target due to their works in governance reform and electoral reform. Open Society Foundation Myanmar is a case in point. The military has also launched investigations into the finances of local CSOs such as Daw Khin Kyi Foundation (The Irrawaddy, 2021) and Free Funeral Service Society (The Irrawaddy, 2021).

Bank transactions for civic engagement activities are at the risk of getting more scrutinised and even freeze unconditionally. The local CSOs which receive funding from these INGOs immediately suspended all operations and activities concerning the potential security threats.

One respondent shared his/her experience:

Beyond the current project, we will implement only specific small-sized, short-termed projects, just like in 2012. When a donor wants to contribute financially, banks demand strict requirements. Such as it requires approval from the social welfare ministry, which was unrealistic by the time.

(Quoted from Interview with an Executive Director, 30s years, LGBT)

Impact #4: Dynamic donor relations become an urgent consideration for local organisations.

Whilst financial flow has been an evident impact, local organisations have struggled to conduct donor relations urgently. Most local CSOs communicate with their donors through intermediary organisations; thus, the accurate information is suspected to be heard for making timely, reflective, and accountable decisions related to financial and accountability issues.

Because of the ever-changing situations, local organisations require a timely and clear response from donors or intermediary organisations about existing and future coordination. When their communication for donor relations fails to get timely or clear responses, local organisations face concerns about activity and financial projection.

For instance, some organisations face pressure from their funding partners to strictly continue their agreed deliveries, although they acknowledge risks. Such conflict of interests between local and intermediary organisations develops around project closure in a few cases. A respondent remark:

Certain capacity-building activities sound irrelevant when the political context changes and all are in a revolution mood. Since redesigning our projects is underway, we want dynamic consultations and timely responses from partners and donors.

(Quoted from Interview with an Executive Director, 40s years, Female)

POTENTIAL CHALLENGES

With arising challenges institutionally and financially, local CSOs are yet to find the coping mechanisms to overcome.

Challenges are no new to Myanmar’s local CSOs contributing to the quality of life and a better future for the people under the quasi-military rule. Almost all research participants agreed that deep-rooted challenges became formidable because of the coup. Since this study covers only the insightful voices of available participants in a limited time, it was not easy to count every challenge and describe it extensively. However, those include significant challenges on the legal environment, operations and implementations, financial viability, stakeholder engagement, and accountability.

Challenge #1: LEGAL ENVIRONMENT

Before the coup, registration of local CSOs has been a voluntary legal procedure to formalise their existence. However, for local CSOs promoting democracy, good governance, civic engagement, public policy, the rule of law, or rights and inclusion of the marginal populations, and so on, staying recognised legally is a dilemma under the junta that refused election results.

Even the Association Registration Law was amended in 2014 after lawmakers consult with stakeholders from civil society, the registration process was not straightforward practically due to arbitrary interpretation and applications. In the registration process, only organisations endorsed by a ministry are allowed to apply. It also requires providing critical information such as personal details of board members and the organisation’s income and expenditure. That controversial legal environment for local CSOs poses a challenge for most of the registered organisations after the coup.

Since State Administration Council (SAC) single-handedly amends laws, limit freedoms, and commit human rights violations by justifying the state of emergency, local CSOs in the long term may face “State Harassment”. While SAC has not been endorsed as a de jure government by the wider public or by the international community, local CSOs find it inconvenient to perform and operate within SAC’s acknowledgement and/or permission.

Even though the registered organisations can enjoy certain tax exemptions, they are mandatory to annually report their financial statements, audit reports and updates on the detailed profiles of board members in the organisation. Under a coup, it is questionable to provide such information to SAC for the sake of security for CSOs.

In responding to those shadowing challenges in the legal environment, local CSOs made decisions and choices, generating another set of questions on accountability issues. (Please see in Challenge #5 ACCOUNTABILITY.)

Challenge #2: OPERATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATIONS

Challenges in the legal environment are also influencing the operations and implementations of local organisations. While the rule of law is bleaching across the country, local organisations find it challenging to implement civic engagement activities which require participation and consent from the local public or authorities.

As research participants represent local organisations influencing public policy debates, they commonly revealed challenges with target stakeholders in their advocacy works. Their operations become unfeasible when their target stakeholders, including elected lawmakers, government officials, politicians, are removed, arrested, or warranted and replaced with the military-appointed ones. Instead of influencing key decision-makers, raising public awareness on civic knowledge and democratic institutions by the local CSOs could also face intimidations in the light of breaching the rule of law.

Even regular constituency mobilising and public relations activities of nonpartisan organisations could be scrutinised and disturbed by the SAC appointed authorities.

As the core activities and projects are suspended or postponed, most organisations have reduced their staff members and struggle to survive by downsizing. On the other hand, some CSO leaders and key actors had fled to remote areas, neighbouring or third countries for security reasons.

As the core activities and projects are suspended or postponed, most organisations have reduced their staff members and struggle to survive by downsizing. On the other hand, some CSO leaders and key actors had fled to remote areas, neighbouring or third countries for security reasons. Those situations on the edge of human resource drain may impact the internal management systems of CSOs. Thus, it needs to re-formulate the strategic plans and operations with available human or financial resources.

Challenge #3: FINANCIAL VIABILITY

The CSOs that are strengthening peace and democracy in Myanmar rely primarily on the financial support of international donors. To ensure the accountability of any CSOs, it is sensible that the CSOs meet the requirements, including the registration under normal circumstances. However, this has become highly contestable after the military staged the coup. On the one hand, the CSOs in Myanmar need the continuous support of international organisations and donors to protect the interests of the Myanmar people. On the other hand, the frame of reference or set(s) of criteria must be adapted to measure the accountability of the CSOs given the changing political context in Myanmar.

The domestically registered CSOs that operated with international financial supports are likely to face challenges if they decide not to extend the registration under the military junta. How can these organisations access international financial supports under such circumstances? How can the rules and regulations be revised to ensure the accountability of CSOs without registration status? These are part of the challenging questions for the domestic CSOs and the partnering international NGOs.

Since the CSOs could not seek funding sources inside Myanmar, they had to rely on international financial supports. The failure to seek diversification of resources and the lack of strategic fundraising also contribute to such challenges. Given the unstable political circumstances in Myanmar, these challenges make access to financial resources more difficult.

In addition, even though the local CSOs receives financial support from the international organisations, there are issues of rigid funding resources, lacking contingency reserves or flexible expenditure. The CSOs that receive financial support from the international organisation may also face practical obstacles such as a fragile banking system inside Myanmar and newly imposed restrictions on financial transfers. Another challenging area is finding the safe passages and mechanisms that can transfer financial supports and/or other resources to the beneficiaries.

All previous efforts to overcome the lack of access to financial resources fall short after the military coup. The military coup also engenders many further challenges, such as accountability on financial management and transparency of the CSOs.

Challenge #4: STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT

With the gaining momentum of CDM, any cooperation whatsoever can be regarded as collaboration with the military. Even engagement to the military junta, as a stakeholder, can seriously harm the institutional image of the CSOs, especially in the areas of advocacy, because any advocacy effort may lead to the legitimisation of the military junta. If and when the CSOs show approach or gesture towards the military junta, they are likely to face public condemnation for colluding with the military junta.

While many CSOs decided to cut ties with the government stakeholders under the military junta, they cannot openly work with the National Unity Government (NUG) of Myanmar since whatsoever cooperation can jeopardise the organisation's security and that of the individual. Therefore, either in cooperation or stakeholder engagement, the CSOs are facing the dilemma derived from the political circumstances that emerged after the military coup. Such situations may persist depending on how the political events will unfold in the medium-term or long term.

Nevertheless, the role of independent advocacy organisations fostering public interest in policy-making processes will still be vital. How those organisations will continue their advocacy work may demonstrate: their expertise on specific thematic issues, their innovative approach based on the experience, and how they build their ties, integrity, and influence among the stakeholders. Since this study has not been explored in detail, further exclusive research on those issues will help the public policy advocacy thrive for Myanmar’s future.

Challenge #5: ACCOUNTABILITY

In the last decade, Myanmar saw numerous local CSOs emerged and operated as watchdogs for accountable governance. There were even debates on the legitimacy, transparency, and accountability of the sector itself in the last couple of years. The backlash of democracy silenced such debates on the civil society sector's multiple dynamic accountabilities and produced challenges instead.

Regarding the accountability of the civil society sector, most of the respected organisations in Myanmar retains through showing transparency on their effective approach, works, and progress before elected government, donors, peers, and the beneficiary populations. However, they have to make every effort to outlast military repression, sometimes at the cost of their transparency.

As part of the willingness to show country-level upward accountability and transparency, registering an organisation requires annual financial and organisational information to be shared before the government agency (as mentioned in Challenge #1 LEGAL ENVIRONMENT).

During the last term of government, many local organisations sought to get domestically registered since international donor organisations have encouraged and set the registration mandatory for partnerships. However, many of those organisations, with an ongoing registration process, have now been suspended. Most research participants from registered organisations have also decided not to extend their registration and not submit required organisational documents annually. The military coup has undermined a good practice for accountability and transparency endeavoured by international partners and local CSOs.

The military coup has undermined a good practice for accountability and transparency endeavoured by international partners and local CSOs.

On the other hand, the local organisations acknowledge that they could not become a credible actor with established accountability without fully informing stakeholders, including the state, partner and fellow organisations, and the population at large.

EMERGING TRENDS

It is an inevitable necessity for local CSOs to serve their constituencies in such a time of crisis. Nevertheless, it seems still vague whether to focus on as the current situation demands different priorities.

At least, the local actors considered short-term and mid-term changes in their approaches until the impacts and challenges they face are resolved or overcome. It is not always easy to assume that all their approaches are strategic. Nonetheless, organisational strategy in many CSOs has become an issue to reconsider and realign for the current situations. Other than their approved strategic missions and existing projects, most organisations decided to work in low profile, sometimes in individual approaches, responding to emergency demands with available resources. A respondent remarks as follow:

Indeed, most local CSO leaders believe in democratic norms, values, and practices, even in their blood. However, they were caught in the activity trap and distracted from the realities of the society they serve. Very often, they could not weigh the people’s political awareness. They even thought that democracy has well-rooted.

In the wake of such a military coup, all local CSO leaders must reflect on the realities of Myanmar society. They must be in solidarity with the people. Most importantly, all their strategic actions should be consistent with local politics.

(Quoted from Interview with an Executive Director, 30s years, male)

As far as we listened to such insights and decisions, these are the visible trends local organisations lean towards:

TREND #1: POLICY ADVOCACY TO PUBLIC AWARENESS

Local organisations, actively advocating for public policies, wish to withstand their expertise, but not with the legitimately questionable SAC. They, thus, look for ways to continue in the public awareness approach because they believe in the importance of raising awareness, skills and values for nation-building and defending democracy. These advocacy groups tend to reorient their strategic vision or approaches and must convince the international community to remain in those areas.

TREND #2: REVISING STAKEHOLDERS

The advocacy groups with continuous research activities mostly assume that SAC will not consider their inputs. They are more likely to advocate pro-democratic groups, including NUG; otherwise, they are in wait-and-see condition. Moreover, they try to include the international community as one of the target audiences, recognising that international pressure yields (in)direct coercion for political changes back on the track to democracy.

TREND #3: (MORE) HUMANITARIAN THAN DEVELOPMENT

There are also cases where international partners invited their local organisations to deliver humanitarian assistance. Thus, some rights-based organisations have changed their services into humanitarian assistance delivery.

Amongst such ad-hoc sector shifts, some local CSOs provide small-scaled, urgent humanitarian aids for public service employees and families of the fallen heroes. Besides such humanitarian aids, livelihood support, public awareness-raising and civic engagement activities through local networks are likely to be “sweet-spots”. Anyhow, many organisations stepped into the humanitarian sector while still wish to maintain their role in the development sector.

TREND #4: DOWNSIZING, RELOCATION OR LESS VISIBILITY

Meanwhile, discussions with funding partners are ongoing and concrete designs are yet to be made; some local CSOs downsized their organisation as a mid-term solution to survive a bit longer. Until freedom of expression and associations are not ensured enough, most advocacy organisations are believed to move forward with possible alternatives such as less visible activities with lower security concerns and sensitivity.

When local organisations respond to the unfolding crisis differently, some think of utilising digital and online platforms for their operations and activities. Some consider working from border areas but are still reluctant to be relocated.